Main Technical Program

Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2

Zi Yang Kang (University of Toronto), Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University and GRAPE)

Auctions as Experiments

Mira Frick (Princeton University), Ryota Iijima (Princeton University), Yuhta Ishii (Pennsylvania State University), Nicholas Wu (Yale University)

Credible Multiunit Auction Design

Roberto Saitto (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management)

Winner's bliss: interdependent-value auctions with horizontal uncertainty

Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley), Yu-Ting Ho (University of California, Berkeley)

Equal-Pay Contracts

Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University), Yoav Gal-Tzur (Tel Aviv University), Tomasz Ponitka (Tel Aviv University), Maya Schlesinger (Tel Aviv University)

Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types

Elizabeth Baldwin (Department of Economics, University of Oxford), Paul Duetting (Google), Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University), Maya Schlesinger (Tel Aviv University)

Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts

Paul Duetting (Google), Tomer Ezra (Tel Aviv University), Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University), Thomas Kesselheim (University of Bonn)

An Algorithm-to-Contract Framework without Demand Queries

Ilan Doron-Arad (Technion), Hadas Shachnai (Technion), Gilad Shmerler (Technion), Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Tel Aviv University)

Reputation in the Shadow of Exit

Daniel Luo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Controlling the Conversation

Martino Banchio (Bocconi University), Bing Liu (Stanford university), Andres Perlroth (Reddit Inc)

Reputational Spillovers

Aditya Kuvalekar (University of Essex), Anna Sanktjohanser (Toulouse School of Economics)

Providing Certainty

Andrew Choi (University of Michigan), Christoph Schlom (UC Davis), Chengyang Zhu (Boston University)

When to Identify Is to Control: On the Controllability of Combinatorial Optimization Problems

Max Klimm (Technische Universitat Berlin), Jannik Matuschke (KU Leuven)

Equilibrium Computation in the Hotelling-Downs Model of Spatial Competition

Umang Bhaskar (TIFR), Soumyajit Pyne (TIFR)

Stochastic Games with Limited Public Memory

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen (Aarhus University), Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen (University of Liverpool), Abraham Neyman (Hebrew University)

Oblivious Learning, Price Exploration and Collusive Dynamics

Yuhang Wu (Columbia University, Columbia Business School, Decision, Risk, and Operations Division), Assaf Zeevi (Columbia University, Columbia Business School, Decision, Risk, and Operations Division)

Experimental School Choice with Parents

Mikhail Freer (University of Essex), Thilo Klein (Pforzheim University), Josue Ortega (Queen’s University Belfast)

Daycare Matching with Siblings: Social Implementation and Welfare Evaluation

Kan Kuno (The University of Tokyo), Daisuke Moriwaki (CyberAgent, Inc.), Yoshihiro Takenami (CyberAgent, Inc.)

Competition and Welfare in Airport Slot Allocation

Sebastian Bauer (Stanford University)

Explaining the Too-Good-To-Be-True Puzzle in Two-Sided Matching

Ran Shorrer (Penn State), Assaf Romm (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Avinatan Hassidim (Bar Ilan University, Google)

Strategy-Proof Information Aggregation in Voting

Tangren Feng (Bocconi University), Qinggong Wu (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

Robust Trust

Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University, GRAPE), Alex Smolin (Toulouse School of Economics)

Calibrated Mechanism Design

Laura Doval (Columbia Business School), Alex Smolin (Toulouse School of Economics)

Robust Regulation: Prices vs. Quantities

Zi Yang Kang (University of Toronto)

A Constructive Characterization of Optimal Bundling

Zhiming Feng (Columbia University)

Corruption in Auctions: a Foundation for the Second-Price and Dutch Auctions

Alex Tordjman (Stanford University), Tatul Ayrapetyan (Stanford University)

Foundations of Double Auctions from Theory and Practice

Simon Jantschgi (University of Zurich), Heinrich Nax (ETH Zurich & University of Zurich), Bary Pradelski (CNRS), Marek Pycia (University of Zurich)

Guarantees in Price Experimentation

Suraj Malladi (Northwestern Kellogg)

Optimal Privacy with Coarse Labels in Screening Markets

Niklas Haeusle (Leipzig University), Daniel Quigley (University of Oxford), Casey Rothschild (Wellesley College), Yanwei Sun (Imperial Business School), Andre Veiga (Imperial College Business School)

Private Private Information in Second-Price Auction

Boyu Liu (Renmin University of China), Wei Tang (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Zihe Wang (Renmin University of China), Shuo Zhang (Renmin University of China)

Paying and Persuading

Daniel Luo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Inference from Selectively Disclosed Data

Ying Gao (UBC)

General Social Agents

Benjamin Manning (MIT), John Horton (MIT, NBER)

Automated Social Science: Language Models as Scientist and Subjects

Benjamin Manning (MIT), Kehang Zhu (Harvard), John Horton (MIT, NBER)

EconEvals: Benchmarks and Litmus Tests for Economic Decision-Making by LLM Agents

Sara Fish (Harvard University), Julia Shephard (Harvard University), Minkai Li (Harvard University), Ran Shorrer (Penn State), Yannai A. Gonczarowski (Harvard University)

AI Agents for Inventory Control: Human-LLM-OR Complementarity

Jackie Baek (New York University), Yaopeng Fu (Columbia University), Will Ma (Columbia University), Tianyi Peng (Columbia University)

Cross-Validation Equilibrium

Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and University College London), Stephan Waizmann (University College London)

Delegated Contracting

João Thereze (Duke University, Fuqua School of Business), Udayan Vaidya (Duke University, Fuqua School of Business)

Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems with Small Buffers

Ariana Abel (UC Berkeley), Yoav Kolumbus (Cornell University), Jeronimo Martin Duque (Cornell University), Cristian Palma Foster (Cornell University), Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Persuading while Learning

Itai Arieli (University of Toronto and Technion), Yakov Babichenko (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology), Dimitry Shaiderman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Xianwen Shi (University of Toronto)

Targeting Without Transfers

Filip Tokarski (Stanford GSB)

Allocating Resources under Strategic Misrepresentation

Yingkai Li (National University of Singapore), Xiaoyun Qiu (Dartmouth College)

Screening for Choice Sets

Tan Gan (London School of Economics), Yingkai Li (National University of Singapore)

Water-Filling is Universally Minimax Optimal

Sid Banerjee (Cornell University), Ramiro N. Deo-Campo Vuong (Cornell University), Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University)

Managing Advance Reservations of Reusable Resources

Yun-Tung Kuo (Duke University), Cong Shi (University of Miami), Yehua Wei (Duke University, Fuqua School of Business)

A General Algorithm for Online Resource Allocation with Recharging Rewards

Daniel Freund (MIT), Rowan Hess (MIT)

Online Matching with KIID Edge Arrivals

Yilong Feng (University of Macau), Haolong Li (University of Macau), Xiaowei Wu (University of Macau)

EFX allocations on multigraphs

George Christodoulou (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and Archimedes, Athena Research Center, Greece), Symeon Mastrakouis (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), Alkmini Sgouritsa (Athens University of Economics and Business and Archimedes, Athena Research C), Minas Marios Sotiriou (Athens University of Economics and Business and Archimedes, Athena Research Center, Greece)

EFX Allocations Exist on Multi-Graphs

Mahyar Afshinmehr (Department of Computer Science, Linacre College, University of Oxford), Arash Ashuri (Max Planck Institute for Informatics), Pouria Mahmoudkhan (Sharif University of Technology), Kurt Mehlhorn (MPI for Informatics), Amir Mohammad Shahrezaei (Sharif University of Technology)

Fair Division with Indivisible Goods, Chores, and Cake

Haris Aziz (UNSW Sydney), Xinhang Lu (UNSW Sydney), Simon Mackenzie (UNSW Sydney), Mashbat Suzuki (UNSW Sydney)

Allocating Public Bads Is Trickier Than You Think

Benjamin Cookson (University of Toronto), Soroush Ebadian (University of Toronto), Dominik Peters (CNRS, LAMSADE, Universite Paris Dauphine – PSL), Nisarg Shah (University of Toronto)

What is Online Privacy Worth? Evidence from an Information Provision Experiment

Guy Aridor (Northwestern Kellogg), Samuel Goldberg (Stanford University), Jialong Li (Stanford University)

Sticky Consumers and Cloud Welfare

Chuqing Jin (Toulouse School of Economics), Peichun Wang (HKU Business School, The University of Hong Kong), Sida Peng (Microsoft)

Cross-Product Compatibility, Lock-In, and Market Power: The Case of Smartphones and Laptops

Yuval Lidany (University of Toronto)

The Privacy“Utility Trade-Off of Location Tracking in Ad Personalization

Mohammad Mosaffa (Cornell University), Omid Rafieian (Cornell University)

The Limits of Price Discrimination with a Bayesian Seller

Yilin LI (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Yuan Deng (Google Research), Wei Tang (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Hanrui Zhang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Simple and Robust Quality Disclosure: The Power of Quantile Partition

Shipra Agrawal (Columbia University), Yiding Feng (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Wei Tang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

The Price and Complexity of Explainable Information Design

Yiling Chen (Harvard University), Tao Lin (Microsoft Research), Wei Tang (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Jamie Tucker-Foltz (Yale University)

Learning and Communication Towards Unanimous Consent

Yingkai Li (National University of Singapore), Boli Xu (University of Iowa)

A Theory of Ghosting

Mohamed Mostagir (University of Michigan Ross School of Business), James Siderius (Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College)

Congested Waiting Lists and Organ Allocation

Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University), Ravi Jagadeesan (Stanford University), Pengyu Qian (Boston University)

Core Stable Kidney Exchange via Altruistic Donors

Gergely Csaji (KRTK, Budapest), Thanh Nguyen (Purdue University)

Naor Revisited: Two-Sided Queues with Strategic Agents

Philipp Afeche (University of Toronto), Mustafa Akan (Carnegie Mellon University), Saif Benjaafar (Unviersity of Michigan), Hossein Dabirian (University of Michigan), Brian Denton (University of Michigan)

Selecting Competing Proposals

Jonathan Libgober (University of Southern California), Peiran Xiao (University of Southern California)

Screening with damages and ordeals

Filip Tokarski (Stanford GSB)

Börgers's Open Question Resolved

Siyang Xiong (University of California Riverside)

Screening Frontiers

Frank Yang (Harvard University)

Optimal coarse targeting in opinion networks

Wei Li (University of British Columbia), Philip Solimine (Microsoft)

On the Inefficiency of Social Learning

Wanying (Kate) Huang (Monash University), Florian Brandl (University of Bonn), Atulya Jain (University of Bonn)

Dynamic Network Influence: The Art of Strategic Messaging

Wei Li (University of British Columbia), Xu Tan (University of Washington)

Optimality of Random Regular Graphs in Sparse Network Designs

Weijia Li (Tsinghua University), Xiaochun Niu (Duke University), Yehua Wei (Duke University), Jiaming Xu (Duke University)