On Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness via Sum-of-Variances Minimization
Moshe Babaioff, Yuval Grofman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Poster Sessions
Tuesday and Thursday poster lists from the official EC26 poster page.
Tuesday July 7
32Information Environments as Equilibrium-Selection Devices: Evidence from 2.4 Million News Comments
Avner Kantor (University of Haifa)
Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions
Giannis Fikioris (Cornell University); Balasubramanian Sivan (Google Research); Éva Tardos (Cornell University)
Dynamic Generation and Attribution of Revenues in a Video Platform
Francisco Lopez-Navarrete, Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano, Oscar M. Bonastre (Operations Research Center, University Miguel Hernández de Elche, Spain)
Coarse Q-learning: Indifference, Indeterminacy, and Instability
Aviman Satpathy (Paris School of Economics (PSE)); Philippe Jehiel (Paris School of Economics (PSE), University College London (UCL))
Near-Optimal Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Few Agents
Gefen Frosh (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Moshe Babaioff (The Hebrew University)
In-Context Credit Assignment via the Core
Keegan Harris (UC Berkeley); Siddharth Prasad (Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago); Asher Trockman (Google Research)
Optimal Auctions for Constrained Buyers with Unconstrained Budget
Batya Berzack, Rotem Oshamn, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Batya Berzack (Tel Aviv University)
Price of Anarchy of Algorithmic Monoculture
Robert Kleinberg, Erald Sinanaj, Éva Tardos (Cornell University)
Strategic Fine-Tuning: Learning from Human Feedback under Incentive Misalignment
Russell Li, Shi Feng, Safwan Hossain, Yiling Chen (Harvard University)
Job Matching with Unemployment Benefits
Alice Mazzacurati (Paris School of Economics, École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Cyril Rouault (ENS Paris-Saclay, Université d’Angers)
Utilitarian Guarantees for the Method of Equal Shares
Anton Baychkov (University of Warwick); Markus Brill (University of Oxford); Jannik Peters (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
How to Price Datasets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Jiaxin Song (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Proportional Representation for Rankings in Content Recommendation
Alina Chadwick, Anson Kahng (University of Rochester); Kiet Nguyen (Northeastern University); Joseph Saber, Rebecca Salganik (University of Rochester)
Robust Resource Allocation via Competitive Subsidies
David Lin, Giannis Fikioris, Siddhartha Banerjee, Éva Tardos (Cornell University)
Stability in Combinatorial Markets with Side Payments
Chiara Vanoli, Alexander Grosz (Technical University of Munich)
Do Not Trust the Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions
Luigi Foscari (University of Milan); Matilde Tullii (CREST – ENSAE); Vianney Perchet (ENSAE, Criteo AI Lab, FairPlay joint team)
The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
Parinaz Naghizadeh (University of California, San Diego); Jingyan Wang (TTIC)
Stochastic Wage Suppression on Gig Platforms and How to Organize Against It
Ana-Andreea Stoica (Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Tübingen and Tübingen AI Center); Celestine Mendler-Duenner (Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Tübingen, ELLIS Institute, Tübingen, and Tübingen AI Center); Moritz Hardt (Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Tübingen and Tübingen AI Center)
Fictitious Play in Markov Potential Games
Onur Unlu, Eilyan Bitar, Francesca Parise (Cornell University)
Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to Coalitions
Ivan Geffner (Utrecht University); Moshe Tennenholtz (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology)
Predicting Complementarities in Multi-Platform Ecosystems: A Graph Neural Network Approach
Rainer Schmidt (Munich University of Applied Sciences); Rainer Alt (Leipzig University); ALFRED ZIMMERMANN (Herman Hollerith Center)
Hidden Roles Are as Expensive as Coloring
Cristian J Palma Foster (Cornell University)
The Walrasian Prophet: Max-Min Fair Online Allocation
Paul Duetting (Google); Michal Feldman, Mathieu Molina (Tel Aviv University)
Quantifying Theoretical AI Alignment Guarantees: Receiver-Utility Bounds in Bayesian Persuasion
Eric Yachbes, Eva Tardos (Cornell University)
EF2X Exists for Four Agents
Arash Ashuri (Max Planck Institute for Informatics); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Alkmini Sgouritsa (Athens University of Economics and Business)
Private Learning in Bilateral Trade
Simone Di Gregorio (Sapienza University of Rome); Federico Fusco (Sapienza); Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Chris Schwiegelshohn (Aarhus University)
Competitive Information Design in Sequential Search
Zhicheng Du (Renmin University of China); Hu Fu (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics); Ying Qin (Renmin University of China)
Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yael Nissan, Tomasz Ponitka (Tel Aviv University)
Reinforcement Learning Based Computationally Efficient Conditional Choice Simulation Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models
Sonal Srivastava, Ahmed Khwaja (Judge Business School, University of Cambridge)
Causal Multi-Task Demand Learning
Varun Gupta (University of Utah); Vijay Kamble (University of Illinois Chicago)
Who Gets the Kidney? Human-AI Alignment, Indecision, and Moral Values
John Dickerson (Mozilla AI); Hadi Hosseini, Samarth Khanna, Leona Pierce (Penn State University)
Thursday July 9
31Strategic Candidacy in Generative AI Arenas
Chris Hays, Rachel Li, Bailey Flanigan, Manish Raghavan (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
When Should Platforms Recommend Items, Categories, or Both?
Tianyi Zhu (University of Virginia); Xinjie Zhu (University of Iowa)
On Co-Staking: Multi-Token Collateral Under Volatile Pricing
Roi Bar-Zur, Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Tel Aviv University)
Wisdom of the Crowd under Coalitional Strategic Voting: A Full-Spectrum Analysis
Xiaotie Deng (Peking University); Qishen Han (Rutgers University); Grant Schoenebeck (University of Michigan); Biaoshuai Tao (Shanghai Jiao Tong University); Ying Wang (Peking University); Lirong Xia (Rutgers University)
Bundling Contracts for Multitask Agency
Yael Tolkowsky, Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Tel Aviv University); Eden Saig (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology and California Institute of Technology)
Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities
Francesco Giordano (HEC Paris)
Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary
Simone Di Gregorio (Sapienza University of Rome); Paul Duetting (Google); Federico Fusco (Sapienza University of Rome); Chris Schwiegelshohn (Aarhus University)
Second-Best Bilateral Trade is 1/2 Efficient
Zhengyang Liu (Beijing Institute of Technology); Ying Qin, Zeyu Ren, Zihe Wang (Renmin University of China)
Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement
Yiling Chen, Shi Feng (Harvard University); Grant Schoenebeck (University of Michigan); Fang-Yi Yu (George Mason University)
Perpetual Fully-Online Approximate Fairness
Ido Kahana, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon (Ariel University)
Mecha-nudges for Machines
Giulio Frey, Kawin Ethayarajh (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
Phase Transitions in a Meta-Population Version of Schelling Segregation Model
Victor Turmel (Université Paris Saclay); Marco Scarsini (Luiss University); Hlafo Alfie Mimun (LUISS Guido Carli); Alessio Oliviero (Sapienza)
On the Power and Limitations of Simple Contracts
Michal Feldman, Shiri Ron, Shaul Rosner (Tel Aviv University)
Reasonably Reasoning AI Agents Avoid Game-Theoretic Failures in Zero-Shot, Provably
Enoch Hyunwook Kang (University of Washington)
The Economics of Multilingual AI
Daniel Bjorkegren, Akseli Palomaki (Columbia University)
What Responses Reveal: Learning, Manipulation, and Incentive Design
Yurong Chen (Inria, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, France.)
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: New Algorithms and Hardness Results
Vignesh Viswanathan (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
Confusion Matrix Design for Downstream Decision-making
Yiding Feng, Liuhan Qian (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology); Wei Tang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
I Can Stop Whenever I Want: On The Effect of Friction, Vigilance, and Timers on Digital Self-Control
Narun Raman (University of British Columbia); Sophie Greenwood, David Rand (Cornell University); Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia); Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University)
Optimal Calibrated Signaling in Digital Auctions
Zhicheng Du (Renmin University of China); Wei Tang (Chinese University of Hong Kong); Zihe Wang, Shuo Zhang (Renmin University of China)
Learning to Design Information
Ce Li (Boston University); Tao Lin (Microsoft Research)
Qualifier Selection Mechanisms in Collegiate Cross Country
Bo Waggoner (University of Colorado, Boulder); Elias Lindgren (University of Colorado Boulder)
Approximate Maximin Share with Subjective Divisibility: Beating the 1/2 Barrier
Xiaohui Bei (Nanyang Technological University); Ding Ke, Bo Li, Fangxiao WANG (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University)
Short and Sweet: Computationally Efficient Collaborative Communication Through Indistinguishability and Coarsening
Mark Bedaywi, Scott Emmons, Nika Haghtalab, Stuart Russell (UC Berkeley)
Equilibria of Round-Robin: Computational Hardness for Few Subadditive Agents
Paul W. Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Giannis Tyrovolas (University of Oxford)
Token-Level Advertisement
Hanbing Liu, Bowei Zhang (Renmin University); Changyuan Yu (Baidu Inc.); Yinyu Ye (Stanford University); Qi Qi (Renmin University)
Budget-constrained agentic large language models: Intention-based planning for costly tool use
Hanbing Liu, Chunhao Tian, Nan An, Ziyuan Wang (Renmin University); Pinyan Lu (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics); Qi Qi (Renmin University)
Job Market: Learning to Coordinate Strategic and Predictive Agents Under Uncertainty
Larkin Liu (Technical University of Munich)
Improved Parallel Algorithms for EF1 Allocations
Kishen N Gowda (University of Maryland); D Ellis Hershkowitz, Richard Z Huang (Brown University); Gregory Kehne (Washington University in St. Louis)
An O(log log n)-Approximate Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Subadditive Valuations
Rian Neogi, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Chaitanya Swamy (University of Waterloo)
On the Informativeness of Moments in Optimal Stopping
José Correa (Universidad de Chile); Andrés Cristi (EPFL); Vasilis Livanos (Universidad de Chile); Victor Verdugo (PUC Chile); Jiechen Zhang (EPFL)